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Religious Non-Affiliation: Expelled by the Right 
William V. Trollinger, University of Dayton 
Abstract: For the past century the bulk of white evangelicalism has been tightly linked to a very 
conservative politics. But in response to social and cultural changes in the 1960s and 1970s, 
conservative white evangelicalism organized itself into the Christian Right, in the process 
attaching itself to and making itself indispensable to the Republican Party. While the Christian 
Right has enjoyed significant political success, its fusion of evangelicalism/Christianity with a 
particular right-wing politics – which includes white nationalism, hostility to immigrants, 
unfettered capitalism, and intense homophobia – has driven many Americans (particularly, 
young Americans) to disaffiliate from religion altogether. In fact, the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence make it clear that the Christian Right has been a (perhaps the) primary reason for the 
remarkable rise of the religious “nones” in the past three decades. More than this, the Christian 
Right is, in itself, a sign of secularization. 
 
 This would seem to be the season of triumph of evangelical Christians. Despite a nearly 
continuous series of assertions from scholars and political commentators that the Christian Right 
(which can usefully be thought of as the evangelical Right) was dead or nearly dead or soon to be 
dead,1 over the last four decades it has proven to be the most reliable constituency in the 
Republican Party. At the national level the elections of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush 
were evidence of their clout, but the great pay-off came in 2016, when 81% of white evangelicals 
supported Donald Trump for president, thus ensuring his election. Trump filled his cabinet with 
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conservative evangelicals, including Ben Carson, Betsy DeVos, Rick Perry, Mike Pompeo, Jeff 
Sessions, and, of course, Vice President Mike Pence. Christian Right leaders such as Robert 
Jeffress of the First Baptist Church of Dallas and Jerry Falwell, Jr. of Liberty University 
routinely find themselves on the national stage, excusing or minimizing what many see as 
Trump’s racism, misogyny, and sexual immorality while simultaneously proclaiming Trump’s 
achievements as the man to make America Great and Christian again. Finally, and thanks in 
good part to the influence of the Christian Right, one of America’s two major political parties 
opposes LGBTQ rights, bristles at feminism, denies climate change (and/or the role of humans in 
climate change and/or the negative effects of climate change), and resolutely ignores structural 
racism and the misery of those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. 
 Add to these political triumphs the fact that for decades scholars of American religion 
(most famously, Dean Kelley, in his book Why Conservative Churches are Growing2) have made 
the case that evangelical churches were immune to the numerical free fall that has afflicted 
mainline Protestantism since the 1960s. In fact, American evangelicalism has been exhibit A in 
the case that the United States is the exception to the secularization that has swept the rest of the 
Western world.  
 All this to say that American evangelicalism would seem to have won the day. And yet, 
as Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox have noted in America’s Changing Religious Identity: 
Findings from the 2016 American Values Atlas, while “white evangelical Protestants were once 
thought to be bucking a longer trend, . . . over the past decade their numbers have dropped 
dramatically.” The percentage of Americans who are white evangelicals has shrunk dramatically 
in the last decade, from 23% in 2006 to 17% in 2017. In the same 11 years white mainline 
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Protestants dropped from 18% to 13% of the population, while white Catholics dropped from 
16% to 11%.3  
 Not only are Americans rapidly disaffiliating from religion, but they are also rapidly 
disaffiliating from evangelicalism in rapidly increasing numbers. Not to put too fine a point on it, 
the conviction that evangelicalism is the bulwark against religious nonaffiliation in the United 
States has simply proven to be wrong. And so, we are left with an apparent conundrum. On the 
one hand, the Christian Right is triumphant, with its president in the White House, and with the 
Republican Party in its thrall. On the other hand, the numbers of white evangelicals are rapidly 
shrinking, in proportions similar to non-evangelical Protestants and Catholics: political success, 
but religious failure.  
What is so interesting about this situation is that it is not, actually, a conundrum. Instead, 
it seems these two phenomena, evangelical political success and the shrinking of white 
evangelicalism, are related. That is to say, the Christian Right, specifically, its success in 
conflating evangelicalism/Christianity with conservative culture war politics, appears to be a 
primary factor in the shrinking of white evangelicalism in particular and religious disaffiliation 
in the United States in general. But we can go further than this. The Christian Right is not simply 
a major contributor to secularization in the United States. It is itself a sign of secularization.  
Evangelicalism and Political Conservatism 
The story of evangelicalism and the Christian Right4 has its origins in the latter decades 
of the nineteenth century. In these years, a constellation of ideas challenged traditional Protestant 
understandings of the Bible and Christianity. Darwinism raised questions about the Genesis story 
of creation (six days?), God’s role in the creation process, and the nature of human beings. 
Historicism (also known as higher criticism) treated the Bible as a historical document, 
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highlighting the Bible’s inconsistencies and errors while also raising questions about the 
supernatural origins of the biblical text. The Social Gospel de-emphasized the importance of the 
fine points of Christian doctrine, instead emphasizing that true Christianity involved living out 
Jesus’ teachings and working for social justice.  
Many Protestants had no trouble adjusting to some or all of these ideas. But some 
Protestants were horrified. In response, conservative theologians developed the doctrine of 
biblical inerrancy, which holds that the Bible contains no errors, and that it is factually accurate 
in everything it teaches, including what it says about history and science. Biblical inerrancy 
swept through conservative Protestantism, and with it a second set of ideas, apocalyptic 
premillennialism, that held that the Bible is also accurate in what it says about the future. In its 
most popular version, apocalyptic premillennialism claimed that if you read the strange biblical 
books of Daniel and Revelation “literally,” you learn the following: that the world and the church 
is becoming increasingly decadent; that as the “end times” are approaching, the Jews will return 
to Israel; that at the beginning of the “final days,” Christ will come in the air (i.e., “the rapture”) 
to retrieve the true Christians; that the antichrist will then reign over the earth for seven years 
(i.e., “the tribulation”); and, finally, that Christ and the true believers will return to slaughter the 
enemy hordes (including Jews who have not converted) and establish the millennial kingdom of 
God.  
It is important to note that, besides establishing that the Bible is literally accurate even 
when it comes to predicting the future, and besides establishing that history will end in ghastly 
violence on a global scale, apocalyptic premillennialism also establishes that the Social Gospel is 
absolutely unchristian. Social reform efforts are not only worthless, despite the best efforts of 
misguided humans, the world will not improve, but they invite the expansion of an increasingly 
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powerful government that would inevitably suppress religious expression. More than this, an 
emphasis on social reform detracts from the primary task of saving souls from eternal damnation. 
As a result, the true task of the Christian is to obey the Bible, get others to do the same, and 
reject government proposals designed to help the poor and advance racial equality. 
A series of Bible and prophecy conferences ensured that by the turn of the century, 
millions of American evangelicals held to biblical inerrancy and apocalyptic premillennialism. 
The publication of the Scofield Reference Bible (1909; 2nd ed. 1917) and The Fundamentals (12 
vols., 1910-1915) further embedded these ideas in the evangelical consciousness, in the process 
advancing the culture war notion of an America divided between true Christians holding to 
orthodoxy and an enemy that had or was in the process of abandoning the faith. However, there 
was not yet a movement. Then came the Great War. For many of these conservative Protestants, 
Germany’s devolution into barbarism, which is how U.S. government propaganda encouraged 
them to understand Germany, was due to Germany’s widespread acceptance of Darwinian 
evolution and historicist explanations of the Bible. More than this, evangelicals holding to 
apocalyptic premillennialism saw the British capture of Jerusalem in 1918 as thrilling evidence 
that the end of history was in sight, as it meant that the Jews could start returning to historic 
Israel.  
In May 1919 these conservative evangelicals were horrified by the fact that liberal ideas 
almost destroyed western civilization. Energized by the postwar Red Scare and its anti-radical 
witch hunt, evangelicals were thrilled that they the faithful were on the right side of history. They 
gathered in Philadelphia to create the World’s Christian Fundamentals Association (WCFA). Led 
by the Baptist firebrand, William Bell Riley, this organization embarked on a crusade to do the 
following: establish biblical inerrancy and apocalyptic premillennialism as the standard for 
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Christian faith; rid American Protestantism of liberal ideas and pastors; cleanse American public 
schools of Darwinian evolution and other dangerous ideas; and, return America to its former 
status as a Christian Nation. In a very real sense, the modern Christian Right has its origins here, 
with the creation of the fundamentalist movement among American evangelicals. 
But the fundamentalist crusade of the 1920s did not go well. For one thing, while the 
fundamentalists were quite successful in fomenting “controversies” in major Protestant 
denominations, they failed to capture control of even one of these religious bodies. Their 
campaigns among Northern Baptists and Presbyterians, which is where they concentrated their 
efforts, did not result in the establishment of fundamentalist creedal statements and did not 
achieve the removal of theological liberals and moderates from mission posts, seminaries, and 
churches. 
As it became clear that these denominational efforts were not going well, conservative 
evangelicals quickly turned to politics, pressuring state governments to rid public schools of 
evolutionary teaching. In 1925, Tennessee passed the Butler Act, which made it illegal “to teach 
any theory that denies the Story of Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach 
instead that man has descended from a lower order of animal.” Science teacher John Thomas 
Scopes, with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union, challenged the law. Scopes was 
convicted, but many or most of the reporters covering the Scopes Trial (much more a media 
circus than an actual trial) shone an unfavorable light on the fundamentalists and their crusade to 
“right America.” The ridicule encouraged many scholars and journalists to conclude that, despite 
the trial’s outcome, fundamentalism was an embarrassing case study of cultural ignorance that 
would soon vanish from the American scene. 
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They were wrong.  Not only did states (primarily in the South) continue to consider anti-
evolution legislation, but the fundamentalist movement thrived and expanded at the local level, 
with churches (some of which were independent, some of which were part of newly-emergent 
fundamentalist denominations) nourished by a network of Bible institutes, mission agencies, 
publishing houses, and radio stations. Still, the taint of backwardness acquired in the Scopes 
Trial remained. In response, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, some (not all) of these 
fundamentalists renamed themselves, borrowing from their heritage to call themselves “neo-
evangelicals,” or, in time, “evangelicals.” 
While the nineteenth-century evangelical movement was noted for its commitment to 
abolitionism, women’s rights, and other social reform efforts, “neo-evangelicals,” 
notwithstanding the name change, remained firmly committed to political conservatism and 
opposed to the Social Gospel. In fact, in the decades after the Scopes Trial, the commitment to 
political conservatism intensified. Not only were fundamentalists appalled by the New Deal and 
the establishment of the “welfare state” as an unwarranted intrusion into the workings of 
capitalism, but many read it through apocalyptic lenses that suggested Roosevelt and company 
were working to put into place an all-powerful state that served as a harbinger of the Antichrist’s 
one world government.  
The Cold War only heightened these anxieties, with Christian America faced off against 
atheistic communism, and with an ever-present threat of nuclear warfare that fit almost 
seamlessly into the end-times scenarios of apocalyptic premillennialism. While the political and 
cultural turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s moved a small minority of evangelicals leftward, most 
fundamentalists and evangelicals remained firmly on the right side of the political spectrum. To 
quote from Righting America, they “decried the antiwar protests and the civil rights movement, 
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opposed . . . the expansion of the New Deal, adamantly condemned the ‘sexual revolution’ and 
feminism, attacked [the] U.S. Supreme Court [for] prohibiting institutionalized school prayer and 
legalizing abortion, and blasted the Internal Revenue Service’s efforts to remove tax-exempt 
status from Christian schools that discriminated on the basis of race.”5 
In short, in the decades after World War I, many or most American evangelicals were 
staunch and reliable and sometimes quite vocal political conservatives. But they had not yet been 
galvanized into an organized political movement; most important, they had not yet been attached 
to one particular political party. This changed in the late 1970s, when political operatives 
connected with the Ronald Reagan presidential campaign intentionally and aggressively worked 
to mobilize these politically conservative evangelicals into a reliable Republican voting bloc. 
This process of “politicization” began with Jerry Falwell and his “Moral Majority,” which 
certainly played a role in the election and re-election of Ronald Reagan.  
Over time the Christian Right became a sophisticated political force, with a host of 
national organizations such as the Christian Coalition, Concerned Women of America, and Focus 
on the Family that were enthusiastically supported by a network of evangelical churches, 
schools, and the like. Both the confirmation of Clarence Thomas as Supreme Court justice in 
1991 and the election of George W. Bush as president in 2000 owed much to the aggressive 
efforts of this political network. By the beginning of the 21st century, the Christian Right had 
established itself as the most significant constituency within the Republican Party. 
So, it is that, beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present, evangelical leaders 
and pastors have publicly and aggressively melded their religious identities and their political 
identities. They have made it quite explicit that to be a Bible-believing Christian necessarily 
means that one is on the right edges of the political spectrum, holds ultra-conservative views on a 
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variety of political topics, and is staunchly Republican. Regarding all of this, and particularly the 
fusing of Protestant evangelicalism and the Republican Party, it is important to understand that 
this marks something of a change. Yes, conservative evangelicalism has been linked to 
conservative politics since the early twentieth century and, especially, since the 1919 founding of 
the World’s Christians Fundamentals Association. Yes, fundamentalists did not retreat from 
politics or political concerns with the demise of their 1920s crusades. That said, there was also 
some sense that politics was a second-order priority, given that (until the 1960s and 1970s) 
America was “safely Christian,” and given that what mattered most of all was saving souls from 
the fires of hell.  
So while it was presumed that the right religious commitments would also mean the right 
political commitments, it was not made to be an absolute necessity. This was the evangelicalism 
of my childhood and youth. While I chafed at the political commitments held by the vast 
majority in my evangelical church and at my evangelical college, while I could not bear the 
predominance of anti-civil rights, antifeminist, pro-war, and pro-Nixon sentiments, I also was not 
made to feel as if my left-of-center politics necessarily rendered me unchristian. To give a 
specific example, at Campus Crusade’s Explo ’72 in Dallas, described on the cover of Life 
magazine as “The Great Jesus Rally,” there were young evangelicals such as myself who chanted 
“Stop the War,” and there were literature tables where one could gather antiwar material and sign 
petitions calling on the United States to get out of Vietnam. While we were a tiny minority, 
easily absorbed by the sea of conservative evangelicals, I think it is fair to say that we were seen 
more as weird curiosities, and less as antichristian pariahs, for opposing GOP orthodoxy.6 
But since the 1970s, the relationship between (much of) white evangelicalism and 
conservative politics has seen a significant discursive shift, with the emergence of a Christian 
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Right that insists that Bible-believing Christians will necessarily vote Republican, and that true 
Christianity entails, even consists of, adherence to a particular form of conservative politics. It 
should go without saying that this involves much more than simply the desire to overturn Roe v. 
Wade. Key components of Christian Right political ideology include: 
• a virulent opposition to same-sex marriage and transgender accommodations, so virulent 
that spending a few minutes on some evangelical websites suggests that the focus on 
combating the LGBTQ “menace” verges on obsession.7  
• a fear of and antipathy toward immigrants combined with a desire to “tighten the 
borders,” all of which is reflected in the 2018 Pew Research Center Religious Typology, 
which reveals that “fully two-thirds” of “God-and-Country Believers” (who are 
disproportionately evangelical) say “immigrants are a threat to American values and 
customs, the largest share of any group.”8  
• a commitment to maintaining White America in the face of changing demographic 
realities, a commitment that owes much to the fact that (as noted by historian Seth 
Dowland) its “identity [was] forged in the contexts of Jim Crow segregation.” This has 
been manifested both in the widespread support of white evangelicals for Donald Trump 
and an unwillingness to recognize the pervasive nature of institutional racism (which has 
led black evangelicals to question their identification as “evangelical”).9 
• a deep-seated Christian nationalism that is, to quote the historian John Fea, “rooted in 
nostalgia for a bygone [and mythologized] Christian golden age,” and that, according to a 
2018 Sociology of Religion article by Andrew Whitehead, Samuel Perry, and Joseph 
Baker, is the best explanation for why white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump.10 
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All of this is within the framework of the “culture war,” with the binary logic that this 
entails. True Christians are on the right side of this war, defending a set of particular religious 
and political views; on the other side of this war, holding dissenting views, is the not Christian or 
unChristian or antiChristian enemy. To adopt terminology used by social theorists Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, spokespersons for the Christian Right have created a hegemonic 
discourse by articulating “chains of equivalence,” in which one set of “truths” is set in an 
antagonistic and absolute opposition to a set of “untruths.”11   
Christian Right and Religious Nonaffiliation 
It is not a stretch to say that many or most white evangelicals in the United States have 
been convinced that there is a necessary and inseparable connection between Christian 
commitments and conservative political commitments. But it should not be surprising that many 
political moderates and liberals have been similarly persuaded that to identify as Christian is to 
identify as an intolerant right-wing culture warrior. And many of these political moderates and 
liberals, particularly those who have had weak attachments to religion and religious institutions, 
have been so convinced that they have disaffiliated from religion altogether. 
Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, who have done the best work12 on this topic,13 make 
clear that the “political backlash” in response to the Christian Right fits very well with the 
evidence that the younger the generational cohort, the more likely individuals are to claim “no 
religion” when asked for religious preference. In seeking to explain why succeeding generations 
have proven to be increasingly disaffiliated from religion, the authors discovered that attitudes 
about sexuality (particularly regarding premarital sex and homosexuality), recreational drug use, 
and autonomy (i.e., valuing thinking for oneself as opposed to valuing obedience) are the 
primary predictors of the differences between cohorts when it comes to religious preferences.14  
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In this assessment, Hout and Fischer are building on Robert Putnam and David Campbell’s 
observations in American Grace (observations that are also based on analysis of the General 
Social Survey data) that “those millennials whose views on homosexuality are more tolerant are 
more than twice as likely to be religious nones as their statistically similar peers who are 
conservative on homosexuality.”15 All of this suggests that the “religiously-inflected . . . politics 
of personal morality”16 are what has alienated liberals and moderates, and, with each generation, 
in increasing numbers.  In short, and as the authors observe in their conclusion: 
Once the American public began connecting organized religion to the conservative 
political agenda—a connection that Republican politicians, abortion activists, and 
religious leaders all encouraged . . . —many political liberals and moderates who seldom 
or never attend services quit expressing a religious preference when survey interviewers 
asked about it. New calculations here . . . not only confirm the correlational pattern but go 
further to support the inference that political backlash is actually causing some of the 
religious disaffiliation.17 
 
Hout and Fischer are careful to couch their 2014 conclusions in the form of inference. 
But as reported in a 2018 American Journal of Political Science article, “Putting Politics First: 
The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations,” David Campbell et al. 
put this inference to the test. In the most fascinating part of their study, the researchers provided 
respondents with fictional articles about an invented congressional race in another state. In the 
control articles, there are no references to religion, but in the other articles evangelical religious 
references are added. As the authors observe, if it is correct that (much of) white 
evangelicalism’s tight connection to the Republican Party is producing a good portion of the 
religious disaffiliation in contemporary America, “then when Democrats are exposed to a 
Republican candidate who is associated with religion, they will become more likely to identify as 
Nones.” This is particularly the case given that many Nones are “’liminals’ who may or may not 
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think of themselves as having a religious identity depending on the context.” The results of their 
experiment combined with their analysis of Secular America Survey data are striking:   
The close association of religion and the Republican Party creates cognitive dissonance 
among Democrats. Many Democrats resolve the dissonance by becoming Nones. Further, 
the mingling of religion and partisan politics leads to polarization, as Republicans and 
conservatives grow increasingly religious and Democrats and liberals become more 
passively and actively secular. Importantly, these processes take shape only when voters 
perceive the mixture of religion and politics, particularly in the GOP—the causal 
mechanism proposed, but to date untested, in the literature.18 
 
Boston University’s Stephen Prothero, writing for Politico in early 2018, does not hold 
back in driving home the significance of this argument: 
The [author’s emphasis] most significant development in American religion in recent 
years is the shocking rise of the religiously unaffiliated . . . who now account for roughly 
one quarter of all Americans. This increasing distance from religious institutions is 
accompanied by increasing distance from religious beliefs and practices . . . There are 
many reasons for this decline in religious believing and engaging. But the most important 
in my view is the increasing identification of the Christian churches with right-wing 
politics.19 
 
What makes this argument particularly significant from a scholarly point of view is that 
while social scientists have long understood that religion affects political behavior, they have not 
taken seriously the notion that the influence could go the other way (i.e., politics affects 
religion). As Paul Djupe, Jacob Neiheisel, and Anand Sokhey point out in a 2018 article in the 
American Journal of Political Science, “scholars have largely characterized religion . . . as an 
‘unmoved mover’ . . . At the very least, religion has typically been treated, almost without 
question, as independent of the political process.”20 The argument (made by Hout and Fischer, as 
well as others)21 that the Christian Right (or, political backlash produced by the Christian Right) 
is a primary reason for the rapid increase in religious “nones” upends this scholarly consensus. 
The notion that the effects could go both ways, that religion affects politics and politics affects 
religion, has serious ramifications for our understanding of both politics and religion. 
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Djupe et al. add nuance to Hout and Fischer’s argument by arguing that it is important to 
distinguish between congregational disaffiliation and religious disidentification, i.e., leaving a 
congregation as opposed to asserting that one has no preference when it comes to religion (see 
Baker in this volume). Focusing on congregational disaffiliation, and making use of national and 
local election data sets as well as the 2012 Portraits of American Life Study, the authors argue 
that the Christian Right is indeed “driving congregants out of the pews, which certainly jells with 
familiar narratives.”22 But the question remains: what sorts of pews, that is, what sorts of 
churches, are these congregants leaving? Not surprisingly, for an individual to disaffiliate from a 
church in reaction to the fusing of religion with conservative politics, the church in question 
would most likely be one in which the Christian Right agenda, in one way or another, is being 
promoted by church leadership and/or an influential cohort of church members. That is to say, 
the sort of churches that would produce congregational disaffiliation because of the Christian 
Right would most likely be evangelical churches.   
As Djupe et al. discovered in their research, “the Christian Right drives out those who 
disagree with the movement those [often marginally connected congregants] who disagree with 
the movement and are likely to experience disagreement in their congregations—that is, 
evangelical Republicans [authors’ emphasis].”23 Interestingly, and also not surprisingly, the 
notion of congregational disaffiliation fits well with the argument that the Christian Right is 
driving people to disidentify with Christianity. Once people are disconnected from their 
congregation, they are then more likely to respond to Christian Right pronouncements equating 
religion with right-wing politics by taking the next step to express themselves as having no 
religious preference at all. 
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This argument is an excellent reminder that the Christian Right is not simply pushing 
non-evangelicals into religious nonaffiliation. The Christian Right is also causing great turmoil 
within white evangelicalism itself. Over the past five decades, there has existed a small but 
persistent “evangelical left.” Best exemplified by Jim Wallis (who was deeply involved in 
protesting the Vietnam War at the aforementioned Explo ’72)24 and Sojourners magazine, these 
left-leaning evangelicals have consistently argued that American evangelicalism needs to jettison 
its political conservatism and return to its nineteenth-century roots, in the process emphasizing 
the teachings of Jesus and progressive social reform. But as the contemporary Christian Right 
has tightened its grip on white evangelicalism, the evangelical left has become increasingly 
active in its efforts to “save” evangelicalism.  
Perhaps the best example of this is the Red Letter Christians (RLC), a name taken from 
the fact that in some Bibles the words of Jesus are in red. This organization was founded in 2006 
by Tony Campolo and Shane Claiborne and includes evangelical left luminaries such as Wallis 
and William Barber. According to the organization’s description of itself:  
The goal of Red Letter Christians is simple: To take Jesus seriously by endeavoring to 
live out His radical, counter-cultural teachings as set forth in Scripture, and especially 
embracing the lifestyle prescribed in the Sermon on the Mount . . . What we are asserting, 
therefore, is that we have committed ourselves first and foremost to doing what Jesus 
said. 
 
As a sign of an increasingly aggressive approach, in April 2018 the RLC held a “Red Letter 
Revival” in Lynchburg, Virginia, near Liberty University, where “they organized to pray against 
‘toxic evangelicalism,’ and to offer a spiritual challenge to Liberty President Jerry Falwell, Jr.”25 
It is possible that the RLC, Sojourners, and related organizations and publications may be 
keeping some individuals inside the evangelical fold. Nevertheless, the bleeding continues apace. 
Returning to a point made at the beginning of the chapter, over the past decade white 
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evangelicalism has been shrinking at rates similar to mainline Protestantism and Catholicism. 
Making use of Public Religion Research Institute data, Daniel Cox notes that approximately one 
third of white Americans raised as evangelicals leave their faith; more than this, “about 60 
percent of those who leave end up joining another faith tradition, while 40 percent give up on 
religion altogether.” 26    
The departure from evangelicalism is even more striking among the young, with 39% “no 
longer identify[ing] as such in adulthood.” Put another way, white evangelicalism is aging. And 
the numbers are dramatic. As reported in America’s Changing Religious Identity, as of 2016, the 
median age of white evangelicals was 55, with 30% of white evangelicals over the age of 65. 
Only 11% of white evangelicals are between the ages of 18 and 29 (the same percentage holds 
true for white Catholics, while 14% of white mainline Protestants are under the age of 30). Only 
8% of American adults between the ages of 18 and 29 are white evangelicals. In “Are White 
Evangelicals Sacrificing the Future in Search of the Past?” Cox argues that this aging of white 
evangelicalism is directly related to the fact that “nostalgia seems to be animating much of white 
evangelical politics.” The nostalgic politics of the Christian Right is leading evangelicals further 
and further “away, politically and culturally, from the American mainstream” when it comes to 
matters of sexuality, and particularly when it comes to the young. As Cox argues: 
While it is difficult to draw a direct connection between the numerical decline of white 
evangelical Protestants and their increasing isolation on sexual morality, the views of 
former evangelical Protestants provide some important clues. Analysis of a 2014 Pew 
study finds that former white evangelicals are far more likely than current white 
evangelicals to favor same-sex marriage (60 percent vs. 24 percent) and believe that 
society should accept homosexuality (67 percent vs. 32 percent). They are also 
substantially younger.27    
 
Young evangelicals may be fleeing, but conservative evangelical leaders are not 
wavering when it comes to matters of sexuality. Instead, they are doubling down. In August 2017 
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the Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood (an organization that promotes the notion 
that men are to exercise “headship” over women in the home and church)28 released the 
Nashville Statement. With over 150 original signatories—including Christian Right stalwarts 
such as James Dobson, Paige Patterson, Tony Perkins, and James Robison, as well as later 
signers such as Ken Ham – the statement begins with a lament that “as Western culture has 
become increasingly post-Christian,” it has rejected the idea that “our true identity, as male and 
female persons, is given by God.” In response, the Nashville Statement affirms “divinely 
ordained differences between male and female,” rejects homosexual marriage as well as 
“homosexual or transsexual self-conception,” and—employing the binary logic of the culture 
war—blasts Christians who differ with them on these issues: “The approval of homosexual 
immorality or transgenderism is [not] a matter of moral indifference about which otherwise 
faithful Christians should agree to disagree.”29 
In an October 2017 Christian Science Monitor article, tellingly entitled “Amid 
Evangelical Decline, Growing Split Between Young Christians and Church Elders,” reporter 
Harry Bruinius quotes Denny Burk, president of the Council on Biblical Manhood and 
Womanhood, as describing the Nashville Statement as: “A line in the sand . . . A person may 
follow Jesus, or he may pursue sexual immorality . . . One path leads to eternal life, and the other 
does not.” But the Rev. Corey MacPherson, evangelical chaplain at Colgate University, had a 
very different take on the statement: 
Look at the timing, my goodness, what was it, a week after Charlottesville? There are all 
these other issues going on in our world, issues of justice and reconciliation, which are at 
the heart of Christianity, and here is a statement that isn’t about reconciliation at all. 
Younger Evangelicals, especially, they just don’t want to be a part of that – that’s not 
what they want to be associated with.30 
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“That’s not what they want to be associated with.” In American Grace Putnam and 
Campbell, in a discussion of the rapid and stunning disaffection from religion on the part of 
youth in the United States, explained that by the early 21st century, young Americans had come 
to view religion “as judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too political.”31 American Grace 
appeared in 2010. Six years later Donald Trump was elected president, thanks in great part to 
white evangelicals. Not only has the Christian Right tied itself to him, but as of April 2018, white 
evangelicals were more supportive of Trump than ever, with one poll finding that they gave him 
a 75% favorability rating.  All this despite, to quote PRRI’s Robert Jones, “revelations of taped 
boasts of sexual assault during the 2016 campaign, moral equivocation about white supremacy . . 
. [and now] two alleged extramarital affairs.”32 As Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin 
observed, “At a time when a great many evangelical conservatives have abandoned any pretense 
of concern for ethical behavior or religious values in exchange for political influence and power . 
. . the state of religion continues to slide.”33  
For a vivid example of religion’s slide in the age of Trump, see what Rod Dreher (author 
of The Benedict Option) had to say about a September 2017 lunch meeting he had with 
conservative evangelicals. After discussing his book at some length, Dreher asked them what 
they thought about the “Nashville Statement” (which Dreher supports). He was stunned when 
they informed him that it was “a pastoral disaster,” thanks in good part to “The Trump factor: so 
many white Evangelicals voted overwhelmingly for Trump that they surrendered the ability to 
speak with moral credibility on anything having to do with sexuality”: 
A couple of people in college ministry were at the table. They said it is impossible to 
overstate how alienating the enthusiastic support their parents gave to Donald Trump was 
to their students. A number of college students have left the church over it . . . For a lot of 
them, their parents’ backing of Donald Trump made everything they had been taught as 
kids about Christianity a lie . . . Listening to these pastors and laypeople talking about the 
Trump effect on younger Christians was quite sobering to me. An older pastor said that it 
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is impossible to separate the Nashville Statement from the massive support white 
Evangelicals gave to Trump. Impossible to separate, I mean, in the mind of the young: 
‘All they see is a bunch of leaders of a movement who voted for a sexually corrupt man 
like Donald Trump who are now trying to take a public stand on sexual morality for gays. 
It’s totally hypocritical to them. I don’t know how the Nashville drafters and signers 
didn’t see this coming.34 
 
The quantitative and qualitative evidence strongly support the argument that the Christian 
Right has been a primary reason for the remarkable rise of the religious “nones” in the United 
States since the 1990s. And while it may be too early to say with certainty, it is very easy to 
imagine, the above anecdote suggests as much, that the post-2016 data will reveal that the 
Christian Right is driving even greater numbers of Americans to declare that they have no 
religious preference. Whether or not “irony” is the right word to apply here, one cannot escape 
noticing that a movement that so stridently opposes the secularizing of America is actually 
helping to accelerate this secularization.35 
Christian Right and Secularization 
The mounting evidence that the Christian Right is a significant driver of religious 
nonaffiliation in the United States leads to one final point, and that has to do with the hotly 
contested thesis that (to oversimplify the formulation) modernization in the West corrodes 
religious faith and practice. For the past three decades, critics have used the United States, a 
modern Western nation with high levels of religious participation, as the counterexample that 
decisively undercuts the secularization model (see chapter 13). As David Voas and Mark Chaves 
point out in a 2016 American Journal of Sociology article, “the state of American religion is not 
the only evidence that critics marshal against the secularization thesis, but the religious situation 
in the United States often, perhaps always, plays a key role in the criticism.”36  But as Voas and 
Chaves go on to argue, the past four decades of data regarding religious adherence in America 
(summarized nicely in this volume’s introduction) makes it very clear that the United States is, in 
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fact, not an outlier among Western nations. On the contrary, the United States confirms the 
secularization thesis for two reasons: 
First, American religiosity has in fact been declining for decades, and second, that decline 
has been produced by the same generational patterns that lie behind religious decline 
elsewhere in the West: each successive cohort is less religious than the preceding one. 
Taken together, these two facts mean that recent trends in religiosity are remarkably 
similar throughout the Western world, including the United States.37 
 
This would seem a compelling argument. But Hout and Fischer point out that the increase 
in religious nonaffiliation has not been accompanied by a substantial increase in agnostics and 
atheists; in fact, not only do many of the “nones” believe in God and life after death, but 
according to the 2012 data, 37 percent of the religiously nonaffiliated pray at least once a week, 
with 22 percent praying daily. More than this, the fact that it is the Christian Right that is driving 
much of religious nonaffiliation in the United States is, according to Hout and Fischer, at odds 
with traditional secularization theory, which stipulates “religion’s irrelevance, not its 
prominence, as the mechanism for waning identification.” In other words, religion remains quite 
relevant in the United States, even as people move away from religion. For Hout and Fischer, it 
is this polarization, and not secularization, that “affected religious preferences,” as “people 
expressed either a strong preference for a specific religion or none at all.”38  
Expanding on this point, Landon Schnabel and Sean Bock have argued that, while they 
agree with Voas and Chaves that there has been a “steep downward trend in average 
religiousness,” the fact is that “only moderate religion has declined, and that the intensity of 
American religion is persistent and exceptional.” Instead of religion becoming irrelevant in 
America, what we have is “the polarization of religion in the United States.” According to 
Schnabel and Bock, as “American religion has become increasingly politicized,” thanks in great 
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part to the Christian Right, the “backlash appears to be emptying the more moderate categories 
of American religion.”39 
Are Schnabel and Bock correct? Does the ongoing relevance of the Christian Right in the 
United States, its significant role in creating religious polarization and thus its significant role in 
producing religious “nones,” undermine the notion of American secularization? While it is 
beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter to address the merits of this particular assertion, it 
is striking as to what this argument leaves out. That is, there is no attention here to the nature, the 
substance of the Christian Right itself.   
One way some secularization theorists have responded to the apparent anomaly of 
American religiosity has been to suggest, as Voas and Chaves point out, “that American 
religiosity is somehow not as religious as it appears to be.”40 This argument goes back five 
decades. In his 1966 work, Religion in Secular Society, Bryan Wilson noted that “whereas in 
England secularization has been seen in the abandonment of the Churches . . . in America it has 
been seen in the absorption of the Churches by the society, and their loss of distinctive religious 
content,” as “religion has placed its common values at the service of the political and social 
institutions of the nation”; the following year Stewart Luckmann (in The Invisible Religion) 
observed that there had been “a radical inner change in American church religion,” in which it 
had become “more ‘modern’ . . . by undergoing a process of internal secularization.”41 Writing in 
the 1960s, Wilson and Luckmann focused their attention on mainline Protestant churches. But as 
Steve Bruce noted at the end of the century, internal secularization had also come to conservative 
Protestantism: “as the conservatives have . . . become more affluent, they have also lost a great 
deal of what made them distinctive . . . the psychologized gospel of ‘positive thinking’ that was 
anathema to conservatives in the 1950s and 1960s is now well established in fundamentalist and 
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Pentecostalist circles, and much of the behavioral distinctiveness that marked those groups off 
has also gone.” (163) Praising Bryan Wilson’s prescience, in 2011 Bruce observed that:  
It is easy to be misled by the continued popularity of religious rhetoric and suppose that 
Americans are as religious as ever they were. In addition to the evidence of church 
decline, we need to appreciate the extent to which the content of American Christianity 
has been secularized.42  
 
Wilson, Luckmann, and Bruce made these observations decades and years before the 
2016 election, in which Donald Trump (misogyny, racism, sexual immorality, and all) becomes 
president thanks in great part to the support of white evangelicals who apparently not only have 
abandoned their (to quote Bruce) “behavioral distinctiveness,” but have given up applying their 
Christian faith to their politics (except in the very narrow sense of opposing Roe v. Wade). As 
evinced by their willingness to ignore the ongoing scandals of the Trump administration, much 
of white evangelicalism in America has become fused with the white nationalist Republican 
Party of Donald Trump. It is very easy to document that the Christian Right is the most 
significant constituency in the Republican Party. But as many, many commentators along the 
political spectrum have pointed out, and agonized over, it is much harder to delineate what 
makes the Christian Right Christian, or religious.  
There is a great deal of evidence that the Christian Right is playing a significant role in 
driving people to disaffiliate from religion. Whether we explain this phenomenon as contributing 
to secularization or to polarization does not change the fact that the Christian Right is a sign of 
secularization. Not to put too fine a point on it, the Christian Right is itself powerful evidence for 
the secularizing of America.  
Conclusion 
So how should we think about the fact that the Christian Right – itself a sign of 
secularization – is clearly a significant factor in driving people into religious nonaffiliation? As a 
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scholar of American evangelicalism, I appreciate what one might refer to as the unmasking of the 
Christian Right, and the clarity with which we can now understand (much of) white 
evangelicalism. As noted above, for the past century the bulk of white evangelicalism in America 
has been tightly linked to a very conservative politics. But in response to the 1960s and 1970s – 
in response to movements in behalf of civil rights, women’s rights, and gay/lesbian rights, and in 
response to increasing religious pluralism and Court decisions in behalf of the separation of 
church and state – conservative white evangelicalism organized itself into the Christian Right, in 
the process attaching itself and making itself increasingly indispensable to the Republican Party. 
In the days of Jerry Falwell, Sr. and the Moral Majority, the claim was that this was all about 
Christian values, all about rescuing America from sinking into a morass of immorality. So, for 
example, the Christian Right’s aggressive campaign against President Bill Clinton was explained 
as an attack on his egregious sexual sins and in defense of a now-bygone virtuous Christian 
America. But now, with the Christian Right’s enthusiastic support of Donald Trump – led in part 
by Jerry Falwell, Jr. – their cover is blown. We can now see (some of us had already seen) that 
the Christian Right is not about personal morality and Christian/religious values, but is instead 
about a particular right-wing politics – a politics in keeping with the history of fundamentalism – 
involving white nationalism, hostility to immigrants, unfettered capitalism (which includes a 
disinterest, at the least, in global warming), and intense homophobia.  
So as a scholar, I appreciate the clarity that we now have about (much of) white 
evangelicalism, the clarity about what the Christian Right is all about, and the clarity about the 
fact that the Christian Right is but one more sign of the secularizing of America. That said, it is 
of course true that one could argue that it is not just (much of) white evangelicalism and the 
Christian Right that has been unmasked. One could argue that Christianity itself has been 
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unmasked, that the above values – white nationalism, homophobia, and the like – are actually 
Christian (maybe even religious) values. Certainly many of those who abandon religion because 
of the Christian Right have come to something like this conclusion. And I get it. It makes sense 
to me. If I thought the Christian Right = Christianity, or Christian Right = religion, I would want 
nothing to do with it, either.  
But as a person of faith, I understand Christianity to be something else. I understand it to 
be centered in the Gospels, in the message (stated quite clearly in Matthew 25) that in the end we 
are to be judged on how we treat our brothers and sisters, on how we treat “the other.”  So while 
I appreciate the clarity with which we can now see (much of) white evangelicalism, I am also 
saddened by the fact that the secularizing of America occurs in part because the Christian Right 
has been so successful in articulating what it means to be Christian. 
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